The Governance of the Jurist in Shi’ite Jurisprudence
Professor Abdulaziz A. Sachedina
University of Virginia
Photo: Professor Abdulaziz
A. Sachedina
The
publication of the book on the “Evolution of the Institute of the Shi’ite
Jurisitic Authority” by Dr. Haytham Ahmad Mouzahem comes at a time when the
question of marja’iya is under closer scrutiny for both its overdue reform and
relevance for modern Shi’ite men and women.
Whereas the juristic authority of a Shi’ite mujtahid is a rationally
derived necessity for the continuation of the spiritual-moral guidance sought
by the community, its classical form and management has raised serious
questions about its ability to provide the critical guidance in the areas of
practical ethics and applied jurisprudence in the day to day needs of the
Shi’ites. Dr. Mouzahem’s study
underscores the importance of this subject for average people who are searching
to understand the importance attached to the office of marja’iya in the 21st
century. The following pages capture the
outline of the history of the marja’iya which Dr. Mouzahem has endeavored to
cover admirably in this book. His style
is straightforward and precise in giving his readers an authentic and reliable
discussion of how the Twelver Shi’ite tradition has survived the vicissitudes
of being a minority within the larger Umma, and the ability of its religious
leadership to guide the community through different ages with a variety of
challenges facing it. The timing of the
publication of this study in the aftermath of the untimely death of the great
leader Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah for many modernly educated Shi’ites all
over the world is perfect. The most
original contribution of this volume is the discussion of the Lebanese Shi’ite
scholarly views on the constitutional authority of the wilayat al-faqih, about
which little has been written thus far. It
is an opportune time for the Lebanese readers in particular to contemplate on
the significance of having able leadership in the Shi’ite communities around
the world to guide people in achieving their legitimate goals in peace and
harmony with other communities.
***********
INNOVATION
OR CONTINUTAITON?
The idea that the Shi`ite
jurist-theologian (faqih) can assume the all comprehensive authority, including
the constitutional and juridical powers, that accrues to the theological Imam
in a Twelver Shi`ite state pending the return of the twelfth and the last
messianic leader, the Imam of the Age (sahib al-zaman), at the End of Time has
appeared to many a scholar, both Muslim and Western, an innovation of a sort
which deviates from the fundamental aspects of the theological-political
doctrine of Imamate. The innovation,
according to these scholars, appears to be in the extension of the Imam's
authority (wilaya) to a Shi`ite jurist-theologian in spite of the absence of
any such provision in the theological doctrine of Imamate. The reason for this opinion, I believe, lies
in the postulate that such an authority of a Shi`ite jurist-theologian can be
derived only through an explicit designation (al-nass) by a divinely ordained
leader, -- the process which is acknowledged as the sole method by which the
Imam's authority in Shi`ism is established.
The theory of Imamate, it is
important to bear in mind, once formulated during the eighth century did not go
through any revisions that could have been prompted by certain developments in
the political history of Twelver Shi`ite community in the subsequent
periods. Thus, even when the temporal
authority of the Shi`ite dynasties like the Buyids (10th-11th centuries) or the
Safavids (16th century) were established, the theological doctrine of the
Imamate of the twelve Imams remained in tact.
However, in the absence of the
political authority of most of the Shi`ite Imams following the first Imam, `Ali
b. Abi Talib (d.40/661), the religious and social needs of the Shi`ite
community very early on gave rise to the institution of the deputyship (niyaba,
wikala) of the Imams. The proper place
for the discussion of this institution was not in the realm of theology which
dealt with usul al-din (fundamentals of the faith, such as the affirmation of
the Unity of God, belief in the Justice of God, Prophecy, the Imamate and the
Day of Judgement); rather, since delegation of the Imam's authority in the form
of deputyship was necessary in the performance of a number of religious duties
covered under the rubric of al-takalif al-shar`iyya (religious-moral
obligations derived on the authority of the revelation), it was discussed in
the works dealing with jurisprudence.
The principle of wilayat al-faqih
(the Authority of the Jurist), being the logical outcome of the Imam's
deputyship in the realm of religious practice, as a consequence, belongs to
jurisprudence (fiqh), and not to `ilm al-kalam (dialectical theology) where
usul al-din are expounded. Although the
underpinnings of the idea about the religious leadership (whether the divinely
ordained prophecy and the Imamate, or the legally determined position of the
juridical authority) were related to the general question of the theological
doctrines of divine justice and divine purposes for human society, evidently
the delegated authority of the jurist in the Shi`ite community was treated
strictly in works of jurisprudence.
Historical Roots of the Wilayat
al-faqih:
Shi`ism offers the modern world with
a rare glimpse of the dynamics of religious ideology that embodies postulates
about active divine intervention in human history to enable humanity to build
an ideal public order. Shi`ite jurist-theologians,
at different times in history, have undertaken to interpret the parameters of
the divine intervention for the construction of a new society and polity. One of the major questions that has arisen in
the minds of piety oriented Muslims has had to do with the existence of
injustice in the society, and the obligation of the community in the face of
that situation. The response to the
question of community reaction to the perceived injustice has depended upon the
current socio-political circumstances and has been conditioned by the precedents
set by the Imams whose answers to similar situations are treated as binding
precedents for their followers.
Historically the guidance of Shi`ite
scholars, whether leading to radical political action or otherwise, turned on
their interpretation of the two basic doctrines intrinsic to an authoritative
perspective or world view that organizes the mundane existence of Shi`ite
community. These two doctrines are the
justice (al-`adl) of God and the leadership (al-imama) of righteous individuals
to uphold and promulgate the rule of justice and equity. In the highly politicized world of early
Islam there were numerous ideas and conceptions about God's purpose on earth
and leadership of human society. The
swift conquest of vast territories and the ongoing process of supervising the
conquests and administering the affairs of the conquered peoples not only
demanded strong and astute leadership; it also required the creation of a
system that would provide stability and prosperity. Central to this social, political, and
economic activity was the promise of Islamic revelation that only through
obedience to God will believers accomplish the creation of a just and equitable
public order embodying the will of God.
The promise was based on the belief
that God is just and truthful. The proof
of divine justice was provided by His creating the rational faculty in human
beings and sending revelation through the prophets to guide them toward the
creation of the ethical world order. The
indispensable connection between the divine guidance, and the creation of an
ethical world order provided an ideological mandate for the interdependency
between the religious and the political in Islam. It also pointed to some sort of divine
intervention necessary in the creation of a just society. Consequently, the orientation of the Islamic
belief system was towards envisioning the Prophet and his rightfully designated
successors as representing God on earth - the God who deputized them to exercise
divine authority to rule over humankind aright.
In this way, the linkage between the divine deputization and the
creation of the ideal public order became a salient feature of Islamic
ideological discourse almost from the beginning. Accordingly, the basic religious focal point
on the creation of just order and leadership, which can create and maintain it,
dominates the world view of the Muslims, in general, and of the Shi`ite
Muslims, in particular.
The dispute over the question of
rightful successor to the Prophet marked the permanent rupture in the unity of
the community that would give rise to two distinct schools of thought in Islam,
namely, Sunnism, the majority, and Shi`ism, the minority faction. The period that followed this first crisis
and tension between the ideal and the real gradually accentuated the growth of
discontent among all Muslims. Some were
moved by profound religious conviction and deep moral purpose to seek solutions
to the injustices which led to revolutions and rebellions as well as
discussions and deliberations. This is
reflected in the early Islamic fiqh (theology cum jurisprudence) literature
that emerged toward the end of second/eighth century. This literature wove together the various
threads of Islamic belief and practice.
The most important question that
determined the political-religious direction followed by the community dealt
with the limitations over the power of a Muslim authority in the state that
ideally existed as a divinely approved necessity to promote justice and equity. In addition, the question determined the
justifiable courses of action that the community of the faithful could take if
the authority in power became unjust, thereby making the state evil. Responses to the above question were greatly
influenced by the religious and ethical ideas prevalent among various Muslim
factions in connection with the duty of obedience to an unjust ruler that
caused disobedience to God. The activist
solution to seek redress for wrongs committed by those in authority was by no
means limited to the Shi`ites only; rather, dissatisfaction and dissension were
widespread among all people.
By the time of the second crisis,
the end of the manifest leadership of the Imams through the occultation of the
twelfth and last Imam Muhammad al-Mahdi (A.D. 941), which affected the
political jurisprudence of the Shi`ites, the notion of an armed struggle to
oppose any nominally Muslim authority regarded as corrupt and degenerate was
postponed indefinitely to the End of Time: the revolution would come in a
future time of fulfillment. This belief
in the messianic revolution to be launched by a divinely guided leader known as
the Mahdi to establish the ideal order on earth is shared by all Muslims,
although the term "Mahdi" has become associated more with the
function of the last Imam of the Twelver Shi`ites. Furthermore, in Shi`ism, belief in the future
coming of the messianic Imam has served a complex, seemingly paradoxical
function. It has been the guiding
doctrine behind both radical political posture, calling upon the Shi`ites to
remain alert and prepared at all times to launch the revolution with the Mahdi
who might appear at any time; and behind a quietist waiting for God's decree,
in almost fatalistic resignation, in the matter of the return of this Imam
before the Day of Judgement. In both
cases, the main problem was to determine the right course of action at a given
time in social and political setting.
The adoption of the radical or quietist posture depended upon the
interpretation of conflicting traditions attributed to the Shi`ite leaders
about the circumstances that justified revolutionary operation. Resolution about the prudent course of
action, in turn, was contingent upon the agreement about and acknowledgement of
the existence of an authority who could undertake to make the Imam's will known
to his followers.
The most important issue during this
period for the Shi`ite community was the right guidance that was available to
the believers even though the Imams were not invested with political authority
and were living under the political power exercised by the de facto
governments. With the termination of the
theological Imamate in the tenth century when the last Imam went into
occultation, the Shi`ites were faced with the issue of the continuation of this
guidance. In the absence of the Imam's
political power (although he still had the right to demand obedience from his
followers) his authority had been located in his ability to interpret divine
revelation, both the Qur'an and the Prophet's paradigmatic behavior,
infallibly. The Imam's elaboration of
the revelation formed, in fact, part of the religious obligations binding on
believers. Moreover, this interpretation
was regarded as the right guidance needed by the people at all times. Consequently, during the prolonged absence of
the last Imam, the Shi`ites sought that guidance in the authority that could
assume the decisive responsibility of guiding the community to Imam's will
under critical situation.
However, delegation of the Imam's
authority to guide his followers to an individual who could assume both the
religious authority and the political power of the Imam when there was no Imam
to monitor the exercise of that authority was dangerous. This danger was perceived by the jurists, who
took upon themselves to produce a coherent response to this situation in their
works of jurisprudence in which the Imamite doctrine that the Imam is the only qualified
leader was asserted. Pending the return
of the Hidden Imam, the possibility of absolute claim to political power and
religious authority resembling that of the Imam himself was ruled out. Nevertheless, the rational need to exercise
authority in order to manage the affairs of the community was recognized and
authoritatively legalized. Consequently,
the duty of guiding the community was undertaken by the qualified Shi`ite
jurists who, according to the Shi`ite belief, became the leaders of the
community through a general designation of the Hidden Imam.
This development consolidated the
authority of the Shi`ite jurists by initiating an unprecedented relationship
between the believers and their religious scholars. It also generated a strong sense of devotion
to the religious leaders in their position as the general deputies of the Imam
after 941 A.D. Gradually, this sense of
loyalty made it possible for the emergence of powerfully influential religious
leadership of other than the theological Imams in the Shi`ite community.
Legitimation of the Authority of the
Jurist in Shi`ite Jurisprudence:
From its inception Shi`ite thought
has given a central position to the question of religious leadership in its
ideology. The question has assumed
critical importance during the absence of the theological Imamate. This is reflected in the debate among the
Shi`ites regarding the theological propriety of the religious scholars to
assume the leadership of the Shi`ite community as the specifically designated
deputies of the Hidden Imam. Regardless
of the importance attached to the continuation of religious-moral guidance the
Shi`ites needed to survive under the de facto governments of their times, it
was not just for anyone to assume the function of guiding the community.
As in the case of the theological
Imamate, which was established through a clear designation by the divinely
ordained authority of the Prophet or the previous Imam, the Shi`ites expected
some kind of authorization from the Imam himself to institute the deputyship of
a jurist to guarantee the availability of authoritative Islamic guidance. But in the absence of special designation
during the Complete Occultation no realization of this prerequisite was
possible. This issue of the proper
designation of leadership was discussed, and exegetically resolved, in the works
of jurisprudence where assuming deputyship on behalf of the Imam became a
prerequisite in the performance of certain public functions, like, for
instance, administration of justice. The
concrete historical circumstances required that jurists make a distinction
between "power" and "authority," and acknowledge that both
the investiture of authority and the assumption of political power were
necessary for the administration of justice.
However, the assumption of both the
authority and the power of the Imam without specific deputization to guarantee
the Imam's confidence in that individual, as pointed out earlier, was deemed as
dangerous by the jurists themselves. The
exercise of absolute authority without divine protection in the form of
infallibility that the Shi`ite Imam enjoyed as a successor of the Prophet
rendered government by anyone beside the Imam inevitably corrupt. This attitude towards contemporary
governments can be discerned in the Shi`ite jurisprudence in which these
jurists responded to the critical question related to the nature of the Imam's
deputyship while asserting the theological Imamate of the infallible Imam and
ruling out the possibility of absolute claim to political power and authority
resembling that of the Imam himself. Nevertheless,
the rational need to manage the affairs of the community in its total existence
was recognized and judicial decisions were made to legitimate exercise of
Hidden Imam's authority, excluding his political power. The
establishment of the Twelver Shi`ite dynasties like those of the Buyids (A.D.
945-1055), the Safavids (A.D. 1501-1786) who converted Iran to Shi`ism, the
Zands (1750-1794), the Qajars (1794-1925) and the Pahlavis (1925-1979) during
the occultation did not change the basic doctrine of the Imamate. According to this doctrine the twelfth Imam
was the only legitimate ruler of the Muslim community and that he would return
at the End of Time to establish the Islamic public order. Nonetheless, the jurists, living under the
contemporary "unjust" governments, had conceived a profile of a just
Shi`ite ruler, however temporary and fallible, who could, in the interim,
follow the Qur'anic mandate of creating a public order that would "enjoin
the good and forbid the evil."
With the establishment of the
Shi`ite temporal power the Shi`ite jurists individually responded to specific
political situation created by this new situation in the political history of
the community. There was a lack of any
definite organization or a strict uniformity in their implicit opinions about
the emerging Shi`ite political power.
The Shi`ite jurists during this formative period of Twelver Shi`ite
thought (ninth-twelfth centuries), although often living under some sort of
court protection (especially under the Shi`ite dynasty of the Buyids) continued
to be private individuals as they are today.
Although less willing than their Sunnite counterparts to relax the
limits of Islamic authority or to encourage obedience to the unjust and
tyrannical governments, Shi`ite jurists were themselves engaged in rationalization
of and accommodation to their historical circumstances. These responses to the existing political
order reflect the tensions within the Shi`ite political jurisprudence created
not only by the Complete Occultation of the Imam, but also by intellectual interaction
between the Shi`ite and Sunnite scholars.
The occultation of the Imam and the minority status of the Shi`ites made
it possible, and in some instances imperative, for them to be quite pragmatic
and realistic in their contacts with contemporary de facto governments and in
the formulation of their judicial opinions about them, more so if the de facto
rulers happened to be professing Shi`ites.
It is for this reason that each work
of jurisprudence is abundantly documented by quotations from the Qur'an and the
Prophetic practice as well as the critical evaluation of the opinions of
precedent-setting jurists. The judicial
decisions and the supporting rational and traditional evidence reveal that
these decisions were made in intimate dialogue with specific situations in the
Muslim polity at the time.
As the functional imams the Shi`ite
jurists became the interpreters and the custodians of the Shi`ite creed,
including the theory of the spiritual and temporal authority of the Imams. The Buyid rise to political power, although
an event without a precedent in the post-occultation political history of
Shi`ism, had absolutely no impact on the central doctrine of the Imamate, and,
accordingly, no attempts were made in theological writings to explain this
political development in the context of the constitutional authority of the
infallible Imam. The Shi`ite
jurisprudence proceeded to extrapolate judicial decisions with twofold
attitude: first, the continuation of the socio-religious structure of the community
was not dependent upon the temporal authority of the Shi`ite dynasty like the
Buyid; second, the consolidation of the deputyship of the theologian-jurist was
essential for the survival of the Shi`ite ideology during the occultation. This twofold attitude allowed the jurists to
regard it permissible for a qualified member of their class to substitute for
the Imam or his specifically designated deputy in almost all cases in which
religious obligations with public ramifications were required to be performed. In other words, the jurists of the classical
age regarded deputyship as a sort of trust on behalf of the Hidden Imam, making
it legally permissible for any of them to act as a trustee of the Imam among
his followers to undertake all those functions that the Imam as the head of the
community was entitled to undertake himself, or would have delegated to someone
qualified to represent him. The
underlying juridical principle in this legitimation process was the rationally
derived rule about the general interest of the community that authorized the
jurists to undertake functions of political nature as functional imams.
However, to generate the loyalty of
the Shi`ites the marja` al-taqlid had to demonstrate objectively, through the
combination of sound belief, knowledge, and character that he could function as
the guardian of the community. Moreover,
his reputation as the most learned was established through his publications on
the religious subjects, and the training of disciples. His character was established by his piety
which qualified him, among other things, to receive the religiously ordained
taxes for distribution among the needy.
With the introduction of
modernization, that is a modern system of administration, modern education, and
modern values, the reforms introduced in the legal and governmental systems
through constitutionalism represented the attempts at modernization of the
traditional Islamic social and political institutions in the Iranian domains,
which generated an intense debate between different factions belonging to a
spectrum of ideologies. The
constitutionalist idea confronted the relative cultural harmony in the
traditional order under the last Qajar monarchs. Consequently, modernization in Iran, however
gradual and at times mismanaged, created tensions in the socio-political life
of the Shi`ite community. In addition,
the uneasy and at times hostile encounter between the traditional Islamic
culture and the modern Western values led to the undermining of the
effectiveness of the traditional Shi`ite leadership in dealing with complex
socio-political developments of the time.
The Shi`ites, seeking the guidance from their functional imams in the
area of socio-political relations in the modern situation exerted enormous
pressure on their marja` al-taqlid to demonstrate the feasibility of
traditional Islamic responses under changed expectations.
In the early part of the twentieth
century the position of the most prominent among the Shi`ite jurists became
increasingly confined to strictly religious matters, a development which forced
their withdrawal from the socio-political setting. The consequence of this thinking was that
both the leadership and the general body of the Shi`ites had been conditioned
to accept that, doctrinally as well as functionally, Shi`ite jurists could not
assume any political leadership, especially in a modern nation state. The religious response to this attitude of
political resignation among the Shi`ite leadership was the reassertion of the
reinterpreted and developed principle of the "Authority of the
Jurist" (wilayat al-faqih) in the celebrated Najaf lectures of Ayatullah
Khumayni delivered between January 21 and February 8, 1970.
The principle of wilayat al-faqih
offered the theological sanction by which to legally consolidate the position
of a Shi`ite jurist as the "executor of the affairs of the Shi`ites"
in a Shi`ite state in modern times. This
consolidation of a qualified jurist's position was substantiated by comparing
the authority exercised by a de facto ruler like a Qajar or Pahlavi shah
assuming and exercising the discretionary authority of the twelfth Imam in a
Shi`ite political order, and that exercised by a well-qualified jurist as a de
facto functional imam during the occultation.
Such comparison, however restrained and subtle, can be discerned in the
Ayatullah Khumayni's exposition of the principle of wilayat al-faqih.
Wilayat al-faqih since the
Islamic Revolution in Iran:
The elaboration of the doctrine of
wilayat al-faqih has frequently been determined in the history of Shi`ism by
the political context and even by the changing outlook and application of the
jurists themselves. Ayatullah Khumayni's
own treatment of the principle of wilayat al-faqih corroborates this changing
perspective and there is a noticeable and significant difference between his
pre-revolution and post-revolution position on the controversial aspect of the
political authority of the jurist, namely, whether it is all-comprehensive and
thus absolute like that of the infallible Imam or not.
Khumayni's earliest public statement
regarding the "Authority of the Jurist" appeared in the work
entitled: Kashf-i asrar. The book is a
detailed response to the anti-religious tract which includes critical
statements about the claim to the political power by a mujtahid. The presentation of the concept of wilayat
al-faqih in Kashf-i asrar is on cautious, traditional lines found in the works
of prominent jurists of the Qajar and post-Qajar era and is enunciated with an
observation that the doctrine has been from the very beginning a controversial
matter among the jurists who have disagreed among themselves on the
"fundamental question whether [a jurist] possesses the wilayat, and the
extent of wilayat, the scope of its jurisdiction which happens to be a matter
related to the juristic derivatives."
Furthermore, he makes it clear that the fact that the jurists possess
the hukumat (the authority to administer justice) and the wilayat at this time
does not mean that they are at the same time "the king, the vizier, the
military personnel," and so on.
Rather, Khumayni proposes the establishment of an assembly made up of
the qualified, god-fearing jurists in the place of the corrupt assembly
(majlis) under the Shah. Such a body
should, in turn, proceed to elect a just ruler (sultan `adil) who would not be
averse to the divine laws and would not rule with injustice and tyranny. Similarly, if the Consultative Assembly
(majlis-i shura) is composed of the pious jurists or is kept under their
supervision, as required by the Constitution, then the state would achieve its
goal of preserving justice and welfare.
In other words, Khumayni's proposition does not rule out the possibility
of the existence of a just ruler as the executive arm of legitimately
established Majlis of the jurists. His
concluding observation in this connection deals with the peaceful role played
by the mujtahids in the Islamic world.
They, Khumayni affirms, did not oppose the independent status of their
countries even when they encountered the unjust conduct of the rulers and
recognized the unjust system they perpetrated.
In view of this peaceful mission pursued by the mujtahids, when they
speak about the extent of their right to administer justice (hukumat) or to exercise
their wilayat, they do not go beyond a few items properly specified in the
jurisprudence, including "[the wilayat] to issue judicial decisions, to
adjudicate, and to intervene in protecting the wealth of a minor, or legally
incapable person. They never bring the
matter of exercising political authority (hukumat) among these items, nor do
they speak about political power (saltanat), in spite of their being fully
aware that except for the law of God all other legal systems [obtained from
Europe] are invalid and ill-suited [for the Muslim peoples]. However, they respect these very ill-suited
laws and do not reject them, and believe that they should be tolerated so long
as the system does not improve."
This hesitant posture in Kashf-i
asrar changed to the more activist stance in the celebrated Najaf lectures of
1970 regarding the authority of the jurist in the Shi`ite nation that
culminated in the present doctrine of wilayat al-faqih. The title given to these lectures, namely,
al-Hukumat al-islamiyya, suggests the transformation of the principle of
wilayat al-faqih to a form of government necessitating the subordination of
political power (saltana) to the divine norms elaborated in the Islamic
jurisprudence. In other words, the
Islamic government is the one in which the religious-moral authority of the
jurists prevails in all the branches of a modern government, namely,
legislative, executive, and judicial.
The lectures, accordingly, outline the urgency on the part of the
jurists to assume positions of responsibility in actualizing the goals of the
divine governance for the humanity.
However, since the broad
interpretation of the principle had implications for the doctrine of the
theological Imamate, and in some ways, as argued by those who were suspicious
of such an arrogation of the infallible Imam's authority on the part of the
jurist, the ideological confusion over the power of the jurist have beset Iran
since the revolution. The ideological
problem stems from the constitutional principle of sovereignty of the people as
exercised through their elective representatives in the modern state and the
principle of religiously invested sovereignty which if implemented absolutely
through the office of the wali al-faqih can render the constitution invalid. In other words, some kind of tension or even
contradiction exists in an imperfect compromise worked out between the
principle of religiously ordained absolute sovereignty of the person holding
the wilaya and the constitutionally founded sovereignty by the people.
The confusion and the problems that
existed in the post-revolution Iran in the matter of exercise of relative
powers of different branches of government, especially the legislative and the
executive, can be traced back to new political system under the wilayat
al-faqih. It is, however, paradoxical
that there was no attempt made in Iran to undertake serious substantial and
theoretical treatment of this central principle until the issuance of the
January 7, 1988 fatwa of Ayatullah Khumayni.
Even in the centers of Shi`ite learning, the religious establishment,
where there existed misgivings about the claim to all-comprehensive wilaya of
the jurist in the light of their perceived role as the protectors of the
people's sovereignty and independence, there was an understandable silence on
the issue because, according to the official position on the subject defined by
Khumayni in the most explicit terms: "Opposition to wilayat-i faqih is
denying (attempting to refute) Imams and Islam." Unquestionably, the triumph of the revolution
under the religious leadership was assumed, at least by those in the
government, as the government of the deputy of the Hidden Imam, the functional
imam, Ayatullah Khumayni.
This clarification of the scope and
meaning of wilayat al-faqih in 1988 had to await the crisis created by the
failure of the government since the revolution to resolve important problems of
society and economy in accordance with Islamic laws and criteria. Furthermore, unresolved questions about a
number of legislative measures caused the reappearance of the ever present
debate between those religious scholars who take the prohibition of human
prerogative to legislate in the narrow and literal sense, and those who, on the
contrary, permit further legislation on the grounds that the traditional
jurisprudence as the series of guidelines is insufficiently exhaustive in its
content for the solution of complex problems faced by modern society. The question centered on the Islamic
propriety, that is, the legal validity, of measures passed by the parliament
and the important figures in the government.
Indirectly, the question cast doubt on the assertion of the religious
class in the modern age that Islam as a way of life has its own distinctive
solution for the main problems of humanity, and it challenged the ability of
the jurists to provide coherent responses to concrete questions like
redistribution of land for public benefit, or intervention in the relations
between the employer and the employee to attain some measure of justice for
which the traditional jurisprudence had no solutions.
The dichotomy between human
legislation in the modern parliament and the Islamic propriety to undertake
such an activity was apparently the origin for the existence of the Council of
Guardians which is formally appointed to approve the legislation as being in
conformity with the Shari`a. On several
occasions the parliament has encountered opposition from the Council of the
Guardians for passing measures contrary to the traditional jurisprudence. Consequently, a number of matters dealing
with urban land, ecological protection bill, nationalization of foreign trade,
and so on were held in suspense because of the unresolved differences of opinion
between the Majlis and the Council of the Guardians. This persistent deadlock in determining the
scope of the power of the state to intervene in matters that assured some
measure of justice in the society served as the background to Khumayni's fatwa asserting
the supremacy of the Islamic state under the wilayat al-faqih in preserving the
welfare of its citizens.
The fatwa was issued in the form of
a letter to the President `Ali Khamnei whose Friday sermon had touched upon a
sensitive matter in the Prophet Muhammad's mission on earth. Apparently, Khamnei had concluded that the
Prophet's function was to deliver the religious message and creation of a state
was not within the scope of his primary mission. In response to this conclusion, Khumayni took
up to publish his response whose key part after the introductory formalities
was as follows:
It appears from your excellency's
statements at the Friday prayer that you do not regard government to be
equivalent to the absolute guardianship (wilayat-i mutlaqa) which was bestowed
on the most noble Prophet (peace be upon him and his progeny) by God, and which
is the most important part of the divine ordinances, having precedence over all
secondary ordinances (ahkam-i far`iyya).
Your interpretation of what I have said that the government is empowered
to act only within the framework of the existing [secondary] divine ordinances
[preserved in the Shari`a] runs entirely counter to what I have in fact
said. Were the powers of government to
lie only within the framework of secondary divine decrees, the designation of
the divine government and of absolute deputed guardianship (wilayat-i
mutlaqa-yi mufawwada) to the Prophet of Islam (peace be upon him and his
progeny) would have been in occurrence entirely without meaning and content. Let me refer to some of the consequences of
such a view -- consequences which no one could accept. For example, the laying of roads that
necessitates the confiscation of houses or of the land on which they stand is
not provided for within the framework of the secondary divine ordinances. Military conscription, and the compulsory
dispatch of soldiers to the front, forbidding the import or export of foreign
currency, or of various kinds of goods, the prohibition of hoarding, customs
duties, taxation, the prohibition of exorbitant pricing, price regulation, the
prohibition of narcotics and addiction, with the exception of alcoholic drinks,
prohibiting the bearing of all kinds of arms, and hundreds of similar measures,
none of these, according to your interpretation, are among the powers of the
state. I must point out, the government
which is a branch of the absolute guardianship of the Prophet of God, is among
the primary ordinances of Islam, and has precedence over all secondary
ordinances such as prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage."
The last statement (italicized) in
the above-quoted text is the key part of the fatwa which was open to whole
variety of interpretations, both in Iran and in the West among the scholars of
Middle Eastern studies. Apparent sense
of Khumayni's declaration suggests that political considerations could override
tenets of the Shari`a. This is the sense
in which most Western scholars have taken the statement to purport and it has
support in the political history of Islam when those in power, whether the Sunnite
caliphs or the de facto sultans, did in fact overrule the dictates of the
Shari`a norms for political expediencies.
However, when examined in the
context of the Shi`ite rational theology, the statement is the reassertion of a
fundamental belief among the Shi`ites and the Mu`tazilites, namely, the
essential interrelationship between the divinely ordained absolute, infallible
religious leadership (the Prophethood or the Imamate) and the creation of the
divinely sanctioned order. The existence
of the government under the Prophet or the Imams is regarded as fundamental
prerequisite for the performance of the secondary divine ordinances elaborated
in the `ibadat (God-human relationship) and mu`amalat (human-human
relationship) sections of the Shari`a.
Accordingly, the existence and consolidation of the government is
rendered among the primary divinely mandated institutions that has priority
over the secondary ordinances such as prayers, fasting, and so on in the
Shari`a. In other words, the primary
expression of Islamic belief system is not the conventionally seen as
fundamental pillars of Islamic faith; but, rather the comprehensive
relationship of the Muslim community to legitimately constituted authority in
Islamic public order. This is the
meaning of the cardinal doctrine of wilaya, and it is the sole criterion for
judging true faith in Shi`ism.
Thus, there is no evidence of
doctrinal breach in the fatwa when the Islamic government is declared as
all-comprehensive to decide all matters pertaining to the welfare of the
people, even overriding the secondary ordinances, if necessary. However, investing this deputed absolute
wilaya of the Prophet and the Imams (protected by infallibility [`isma] against
committing acts of injustices) to the government headed by the jurist (regarded
as being in possession of sound belief, knowledge, and character [`adala])
raises the ever present suspicion in the Shi`ite juridical writings about the
legitimacy of anyone claiming the absolute, all-powerful authority of the infallible
leader during the occultation.
More indicative of this
transformation to all-powerful wilayat al-faqih was Khumayni's statement (in
the same fatwa, following the key declaration) that the Islamic
"government can unilaterally abrogate legal (shar`i) contracts it has
concluded with its own people whenever the contract is contrary to the interest
of the country and of Islam."
According to this, the government under the "Guardian Jurist"
could exercise unrestricted power to abolish matters that have been
traditionally part of the mu`amalat (inter-personal, human-human relationship)
section of the jurisprudence in the undefined "interest of the country and
Islam." In other words, the
constitution that served as the protector of people's sovereignty was virtually
brought under the absolute power of the Islamic leadership under the aegis of
wilayat al-faqih,-- the only entity qualified to define the parameters of the
"interest of the country and Islam."
The Islamic government, hence, was empowered to:
"prevent
any act performed as part of one's relationship to God (`ibadi) or otherwise in
nature, the fulfillment of which runs counter to the interests of Islam, as
long as it continues to be harmful to Islam.
For example, it can temporarily forbid the performance of annual
pilgrimage (hajj), one of the most important duties decreed by God, whenever a
pilgrimage is contrary to the welfare of Islam.
What is previously being said or is now being said on the subject [of
the wilayat al-faqih] derives from an inadequate knowledge of the wilayat-i
mutlaqa (absolute guardianship)."
What
was in fact said at that time was that the entire jurisprudence in its
classical formulations would be rendered null and void because of the powers
that the Islamic government could claim in the interest of the country and
Islam.
Khumayni's
innovative exposition of wilayat al-faqih in this fatwa was intended to provide
solutions to the practical socio-economic problems at the legal-theoretical
level by empowering the Majlis which, since the establishment of the Islamic
republic, had faced with the fundamental question about the propriety of the
Majlis in enactment of the laws for a modern nation state. Furthermore, it was meant to confer on the
Majlis the religious legitimacy to enable the execution of its decisions as
being in conformity with the "interests of Islam and society." This was predictably reflected in Khamnei's
interpretation of Khumayni's fatwa when in its support he declared that the
jurist who holds the wilayat al-faqih should be obeyed because his command is
"the command of God. and, it is, therefore, religiously incumbent to obey
(wajibu'l-ita`at) him." In
addition, Khamnei asserted that the wali-yi faqih was the only source of
religious authorization not only for the Majlis but also for all branches of
government, and even the constitution of the Islamic Republic "which
provides the criteria and framework for all legislation derives its
consideration (i`tibar) from being accepted and confirmed by the wali-yi
faqih.....The validity of all organs of government depends on the wali-yi
faqih. To oppose it [government] is
haram (prohibited) and a major sin, because it is being instituted by the
wali-yi faqih, with the permission of God."
Such absolute interpretation of the
fatwa by the then President of Iran connoted the elevation of the marja`
al-taqlid (the most learned juridical authority in the Shi`ite community) to
the absolute ruler of the Shi`ites whose unrestricted authority and pleasure
allowed the governmental institutions to function. However, it also marked the permanent breach
between the office of the marja`, which also included the limited wilaya
("guardianship") traditionally conceived in the jurisprudence, and
the virtually unrestricted wilaya expounded by Khumayni in his position as one
of the marja` and promulgated in the modern constitution of Iran.
Such
implications became explicit when Khumayni died in 1989, leaving his position
as marja` to be filled by other leading jurists in the country. But his position as the wali-yi faqih, in
theory at least, could not be assumed except by another marja` of similar
status in learning and piety. To
accommodate this vacuum in the constitutionally ratified leadership of the
Shi`ite polity the Council of Guardians were forced to abandon a
well-established tradition in Shi`ite Islam, namely, the recognition of the
juridical excellences of the mujtahid before declaring one's allegiance to that
authority as the marja` al-taqlid and wali al-faqih. There was no provision in the traditionally
expounded principle of wilayat al-faqih, even in its limited form, for a
non-mujtahid to assume the position of the "Guardian Jurist." It was only through a modern constitutional
provision that Hujjatu'l-islam `Ali Khamnei could be elevated to the position
of ayatullah. However, the assumption of
the position of wali-yi faqih, similar to the Ayatullah Khumayni without the
qualifications required in a mujtahid, was not possible without circumventing
the well-stated prerequisites. This was
probably achieved by using the more political, and even Sunnite in connotation,
title of wali-yi amr-i muslimin (the person in whom authority to manage the
affairs of the Muslims has been invested) for Ayatullah Khamnei, as the
successor to the religious leadership in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Accordingly, whereas traditionally loyalty
and devotion to the religious leaders in Shi`ism was always the consequence of
one's personal consent, now loyalty to the Ayatullah Khamnei, as the holder of
the office of the wali al-faqih is prescribed by the constitution of Iran.
In conclusion, it is probably
correct to maintain that the constitutionalization of wilayat al-faqih, in its
broader interpretation, was made possible because of the leadership of the
Ayatullah Khumayni, which combined the authority of the marja` al-taqlid and
the wali al-faqih. However, after his
death, the wilayat al-faqih has been assumed by the Council of Guardians, who,
for political reasons, have restricted it to the political dimension of this
position, similar to that assumed by the wali al-'amr of the Muslims, while
retaining the juridical dimension of it within the jurisdiction of the Council,
until further progression in the political history of the Shi`ite community
could accommodate another wali al-mutlaq (the absolute guardian) in Iran. Moreover, the present status of the principle
of the wilayat al-faqih underscores the culmination of its gradual
particularization in the Iranian Shi`ite context, because it has ceased to be
of relevance beyond its geographical
boundaries. In all probability, its
relevance in Iran has been overshadowed by the complex practical problems faced
by the nation confronted by more immediate concerns of reinstating itself as a
credible member of the modern international order than being regarded as the
hope of "the downtrodden" for the creation of an international Muslim
order under the wilayat al-faqih (Authority of the Jurist). Nevertheless,
the religious experience of the Shi`ites has nurtured uneasiness in the event
of injustices inflicted by those in power.
As such, it will be hardly surprising to witness another revolution of
"the downtrodden" under their religious leaders in the context of
messianic aspiration of the Shi`ites for the rule of justice and equity on
earth.
Professor
Abdulaziz Sachedina is the Frances Myers Ball (Chair) Professor of Religious
Studies at the University of Virginia. He is the author of many books and
studies, the most prominent are:
“The
Just Ruler in Shi'ite Islam: The Comprehensive Authority of the Jurist in
Imamite Jurisprudence Oxford University Press Inc (USA), 1998.
“The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism
Oxford University Press Inc (USA), 2000”; “Islamic Biomedical Ethics Oxford
University Press (USA), 2009’.
“Islamic messianism: the idea of Mahdī in
twelver Shīʻism, State University of New York, 1981”.
Human
Rights and the Conflict of Cultures co-authored with David Little and John
Kelsay: South Carolina Press (USA), 1988”.
“Prolegomena to the Qur'an" being trans
of Abu al-Qasim al-Khui's Al-Bayan Oxford University Press (USA), 1988”
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